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ince the mid-1990s, advocates for increased access to justice have 
touted unbundled (or limited-scope, or discrete-task) legal services 
as a means of distributing legal services to those unable to afford 
full legal representation.1 In response, a growing number of states 
are adopting court rules permitting lawyers to make limited appear-
ances for particular stages of the litigation, without requiring a motion for 
leave to withdraw from the case after the service is rendered.2 Another form — 
possibly the most common — of discrete-task representation is ghostwriting. 
Attorney Forrest Mosten, the “father” of unbundling, includes in his examples 
of the practice: “Lawyers can ghostwrite letters or court pleadings for the client 
to transmit or review and comment on documents the client has prepared, or 
be engaged only to send a letter on behalf of the client on law-firm letterhead.”3 
Surely, ghostwriting existed well before Mosten included it in his exam-
ples of unbundled legal services. There is no way of knowing how many, and 
for how long, lawyers and nonlawyers have engaged in ghostwriting plead-
ings to assist pro se litigants — indigent or nonindigent. It is reasonable to 
assume that many lawyers and others have acted as ghostwriters in order to 
facilitate greater access to the court, rather than for personal gain, because fees 
for such services —  if any are even charged — are much lower than for full 
representation. Despite the laudable motives of ghostwriters, ghostwriting 
has historically been considered an illegitimate form of unbundling because of 
the spate of federal court opinions opposing the practice on ethical and Rule 
11-violation grounds.4 
This article addresses the current anomalous situation in which federal courts, 
on the one hand, and the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility and a growing number of state high courts and ethics commit-
tees, on the other hand, diverge in their opinions regarding the propriety of 
ghostwriting. I present the results of a study of 179 federal and state court 
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opinions on the subject. After analyzing 
the opinions, I conclude with a recom-
mendation to harmonize the federal and 
state courts’ views on the subject by way 
of a uniform act or rule that addresses 
the concerns of those courts that have 
found ghostwriting to be harmless and 
furthering access to courts, and those 
viewing it as unethical, a violation of 
Rule 11, or a practice that gives pro se 
litigants an undue advantage over their 
represented adversaries. 
FEDERAL COURTS’ OBJECTIONS 
TO GHOSTWRITING
The first of three seminal court opin-
ions on ghostwriting, often cited by 
federal courts, did not raise ethics or a 
rule violation as the basis of its opposi-
tion to ghostwriting.5 The case involved 
a “habitual litigant” who had filed over 
30 lawsuits in five or six years, with the 
help of a ghostwriter:
 [W]e see no good or sufficient 
reason for depriving the opposition 
and the Court of the identity of the 
legal representatives involved so 
that we can proceed properly with 
the relative assistance that comes 
from dealing in the open. . . . [W] e 
should not be asked to add the extra 
strain to our labors in order to make 
certain that the pro se party is fully 
protected in his rights. . . . [T]his 
unrevealed support in the back-
ground enables an attorney to launch 
an attack against another member 
of the Bar . . . without showing his 
face. This smacks of the gross unfair-
ness that characterizes hit-and-run 
tactics.6 
A second opinion issued a year later 
involving the same pro se plaintiff held 
that ghostwriting was, in some unstated 
manner, “grossly unfair to both this 
court and the opposing lawyers and 
should not be countenanced.”7 A third 
early, oft-cited opinion from the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
involving a prisoner seeking a free trial 
transcript rested its condemnation of 
ghostwriting on Rule 11: “What we fear 
is that in some cases actual members of 
the bar represent petitioners, informally 
or otherwise, and prepare briefs for 
them which the assisting lawyers do not 
sign,” and which the court considered a 
violation of Rule 11.8
The aforementioned rulings form the 
basis of most subsequent federal deci-
sions finding ghostwriting unacceptable 
on ethical and Rule 11 grounds. Later 
opinions raised an additional “undue 
advantage” argument:
 [The plaintiff’s] pleadings seemingly 
filed pro se but drafted by an attorney 
would give him the unwarranted 
advantage of having a liberal plead-
ing standard applied whilst holding 
the plaintiffs to a more demanding 
scrutiny. Moreover, such undisclosed 
participation by a lawyer that 
permits a litigant falsely to appear as 
being without professional assistance 
would permeate the proceedings. 
The pro se litigant would be granted 
greater latitude as a matter of judi-
cial discretion in hearings and trials. 
The entire process would be skewed 
to the distinct disadvantage of the 
nonoffending party.9
 
The language in the former 
ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Responsibility (MRPR) Rule 1.2(c) 
specifically permits lawyers to “limit 
the scope of the representation if the 
limitation is reasonable under the 
circumstances and the client gives 
informed consent.” But federal courts 
have handed down numerous decisions 
holding that the ghostwriting lawyer 
breaches a number of ethical duties 
contained in the current ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 
(or its earlier iterations) or state rules 
of professional responsibility. These 
include arguments that a lawyer ghost-
writer breaches the duty of candor to 
the tribunal by making false statements 
to the court.10 Some courts go beyond 
the violation of the candor requirement, 
holding that to ghostwrite pleadings 
is an act of fraud, misrepresentation, 
or deceit. They cite sections of MRPC 
Rule 8.4, which states that “[i]t is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, know-
ingly assist or induce another to do so, 
or do so through the acts of another; . . . 
(c) engage in conduct involving dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 
[or] (d) engage in conduct that is preju-
dicial to the administration of justice.”11 
Rule 11 Objections. In my 2002 arti-
cle entitled In Defense of Ghostwriting,12 
I argued that none of the federal court’s 
legal bases for opposing ghostwrit-
ing had any merit. On the Rule 11 
argument, I first noted that no court 
rules explicitly prohibit ghostwrit-
ing. Neither Rule 11’s language nor its 
spirit justifies a blanket prohibition on 
ghostwriting for a pro se litigant absent 
reasonable grounds to believe that the 
practice involved intentional deception 
or an effort to avoid the rules.13 Also, 
the 1993 Advisory Committee Notes 
specifically provide that Rule 11 applies 
not only to signatories of pleadings, but 
to anyone responsible for a violation 
of the Rule.14 Thus, absent reasonable 
grounds to believe the Rule has been 
violated, I argued there is no justifica-
tion for invoking Rule 11 as a pretext 
for barring ghostwriting or compelling 
disclosure of the ghostwriter’s identity.
Undue Advantage Objection. As 
to the undue advantage argument, I 
explained that the liberality rule for 
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review of pro se pleadings15 was no 
different from the rule (at the time) that 
no complaint may be dismissed unless 
“it appears beyond doubt that the plain-
tiff can prove no set of facts in support 
of his claim which would entitle him 
to relief.”16 And, since all complaints 
must be “construed generously,”17 
pleadings — filed pro se or otherwise 
— are entitled to liberal construction. 
(The Supeme Court “Twiqbal” opinions 
altered the general pleading standards, 
requiring complaints to allege plausible 
claims.) Moreover, Rule 11 applies to all 
papers filed in an action, not only the 
initial complaint. But most concerns 
raised about ghostwriting deal with the 
initial complaint. And any shortcom-
ings of a complaint may be amended, so 
the difference between the pro se liberal-
ity rule and the general rule of liberality 
is “a distinction without a difference. 
In either case the plaintiff will seek to 
correct the deficiencies . . . . As such, 
where is the undue advantage or unfair-
ness to the represented party?”18 As I 
wrote in my 2002 article:
 Practically speaking, . . . ghost-
writing is obvious from the face of 
the legal papers filed, a fact that 
prompts objections to ghostwrit-
ing in the first place. . . . Thus, 
where the court sees the higher 
quality of the pleadings, there is 
no reason to apply any liberality in 
construction because liberality is, 
by definition, only necessary where 
pleadings are obscure. If the plead-
ing can be clearly understood, but 
an essential fact or element is miss-
ing, neither an attorney-drafted nor 
a pro se-drafted complaint should 
survive the [dispositive] motions. 
A court that refuses to dismiss or 
enter summary judgment against a 
non-ghostwritten pro se pleading 
that lacks essential facts or elements 
commits reversible error in the same 
manner as if it refuses to deny such 
dispositive motions against an attor-
ney-drafted complaint.19
Permitting ghostwriting so that 
claims and defenses are adequately 
crafted levels the playing field and 
streamlines the litigation process by 
clarifying the issues and reducing the 
number of dispositive motions and 
responses.20 
Ethics Objections. Aside from the 
general principle that lawyers may 
provide limited representation,21 the 
MRPC does not explicitly address 
the ghostwriting issue. In Informal 
Ethics Opinion 1414 (1978), the ABA 
Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility considered 
a case of a lawyer who drafted a pro se 
litigant’s pleadings and memoranda, sat 
in on his client’s trial, and provided him 
advice, all without entering a formal 
appearance.22 The committee found that 
a lawyer who gives advice to or drafts 
a pleading for a client does not violate 
any of the Canons of Ethics under the 
former ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility. If, however, a lawyer 
provides additional legal services, the 
propriety of his conduct will depend 
upon the facts and the extent of the 
lawyer’s participation on behalf of a liti-
gant who appears to the court and other 
counsel as not having representation. 
In other words, if a lawyer engages in 
“extensive and undisclosed participation 
. . . that permits the litigant to falsely 
appear as lacking professional assis-
tance,” then the lawyer violates the duty 
of candor to the tribunal.23
Soon after Opinion 1414 was issued, 
the positions of state courts and ethics 
bodies fell into three categories: (1) 
those requiring disclosure of the fact that 
“extensive” or “substantial” assistance 
beyond drafting of pleadings was being 
received (the ABA approach); (2) those 
finding that the act of ghostwriting a 
pleading and little more constitutes per 
se extensive or substantial assistance 
Permitting 
ghostwriting 
so that claims 
and defenses are 
adequately crafted 
levels the playing 
field and streamlines 
the litigation process.
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and requires disclosure of the identity of 
the ghostwriter (or disclosure that such 
assistance was received); and (3) those 
finding that attorneys entering into 
limited services agreements are bound 
by all professional responsibility rules, 
but that no disclosure of ghostwriters’ 
identities was required.24
In its 2007 Formal Ethics Opinion 
07-446 (Opinion 07-446), the ABA 
Standing Committee reversed itself, 
finding no unethical conduct on the 
part of lawyers performing ghostwrit-
ing services.25 The committee decided: 
“A lawyer may provide legal assistance 
to litigants appearing before tribunals 
‘pro se’ and help them prepare writ-
ten submissions without disclosing or 
ensuring the disclosure of the nature or 
extent of such assistance.”26 The commit-
tee found that “the fact that a litigant 
submitting papers to a tribunal on a 
pro se basis has received legal assistance 
behind the scenes is not material to the 
merits of the litigation”;27 “permitting 
a litigant to file papers that have been 
prepared with the assistance of coun-
sel without disclosing the nature and 
extent of such assistance will not secure 
unwarranted ‘special treatment’ for that 
litigant or otherwise unfairly prejudice 
other parties to the proceeding. . . . [I] f 
the undisclosed lawyer has provided 
effective assistance, the fact that a 
lawyer was involved will be evident to 
the tribunal. If the assistance has been 
ineffective, the pro se litigant will not 
have secured an unfair advantage”;28 
there is no violation of the prohibition 
upon dishonesty under MRPC 8.4(c) 
because “[t]he lawyer is making no 
statement at all to the forum regarding 
the nature or scope of the representa-
tion, and indeed, may be obliged under 
Rules 1.210 and 1.611  not to reveal 
the fact of the representation. Absent 
an affirmative statement by the client, 
which can be attributed to the lawyer, 
that the documents were prepared with-
out legal assistance, the lawyer has not 
been dishonest within the meaning of 
Rule 8.4(c)”;29 and, for the same reason, 
“we reject the contention that a lawyer 
who does not appear in the action 
circumvents court rules requiring the 
assumption of responsibility for their 
pleadings. Such rules apply only if a 
lawyer signs the pleading and thereby 
makes an affirmative statement to the 
tribunal concerning the matter. Where 
a pro se litigant is assisted, no such duty 
is assumed.”30
 A growing number of states’ legal 
ethics committees now agree with the 
ABA position. They reversed their 
previous opposition to the practice 
based on the 1978 Opinion 1414, and 
now hold that ghostwriting is permissi-
ble, with some variation in ghostwriter 
identity disclosure requirements. But 
the overwhelming number of federal 
courts that have expressed an opinion 
on the subject, with one exception,31 
persist in their view that limited repre-
sentation and ghostwriting violate 
various state ethics rules (as there are no 
federal ethics rules for lawyers), even in 
a  state where local rules permit ghost-
writing. Colorado, for example, is a state 
that permits limited representation and 
disclosed ghostwriting, but federal courts 
there prohibit these practices.32 
One critique of Opinion 07-446 (in 
an ABA publication, no less), stating 
that the decision is “seriously flawed,” 
essentially rehashes all the arguments 
specifically rejected by the ethics 
committee.33 This critique relies exclu-
sively on the federal anti-ghostwriting 
case law. It raises the candor-to-the-
tribunal issue, disregarding the fact 
this ethical duty expressly applies only 
to “advocates” before the court.34 The 
authors raise potential Rule 11 concerns, 
disregarding the fact that courts have 
the power to hail into court persons or 
firms that promote the litigation but 
do not sign their name to pleadings.35 
They argue that ghostwriting could be 
material to litigation because “a lawyer 
may craft claims or spot defenses that 
the pro se litigant would not, or [would 
not] be able to, [and] craft arguments to 
defeat summary judgment that a pro se 
litigant would never be able to make”36 
— as if that were so bad. Lastly, they 
argue that ghostwriting has the poten-
tial to give ghostwriting lawyers “a 
free pass to defame or insult courts,”37 
in violation of the ethical prohibition 
against challenging the integrity of the 
judiciary, surely a speculative stretch, 
and not sufficient to delegitimize ghost-
writing generally. 
Another commentator said that the 
opinion contained “circular reasoning,” 
and that it “appears to be an attempt 
to ease the burden on judges and to 
encourage attorneys to help pro se liti-
gants.”38 One wonders why that would 
be an improper motivation underlying 
the opinion. Also skeptical of the prac-
tice are the authors of the ABA/BNA 
Lawyers’ Manual on Professional Conduct, 
who continue to caution that “[l]awyers 
who help a pro se litigant by ‘ghostwrit-
ing’ a pleading or other court document 
without revealing their role in creating 
the document are arguably circumvent-
ing their Rule 11 obligation to certify 
that the pleadings have merit.”39 And 
insurance defense lawyers are now 
getting advice regarding “practical 
strategies that you can employ against 
pro se litigants assisted by ghostwriting 
attorneys to achieve the best possible 
results for your client.”40
 Others, however, welcome Opinion 
07-446. One attorney, commenting on 
the undue advantage argument rejected 
by the committee, stated: “Treating 
pleadings more leniently does not make 
it more likely that a pro se litigant will 
win. . . . It simply makes it more likely 
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that the pro se litigant’s case will be 
heard on the merits.”41 Even in the habeas 
corpus petition-drafting context, the new 
rule also has positive implications: 
 [F]or those who do wish to practice 
without making an appearance for 
even a portion of a case, the ethical 
freedom to decline to disclose any 
amount of ghosting is attractive. 
This is particularly true because 
the ghost lawyer has no guarantee 
that the client will follow the game 
plan as created and designed by the 
lawyer. . . . This approach affords 
more options to clients who either 
cannot afford a lawyer in an ancillary 
criminal proceeding or do not want 
to turn their case over completely to 
a lawyer.42 
Opinion 07-446 did not authorize 
ghostwriting as such, since limited 
representation is expressly permitted 
under MRPC 1.2(c). The critical issue is 
disclosure of the ghostwriter’s identity. 
We will now examine the variation in 
state rules governing this issue.
STATE RULES GOVERNING 
GHOSTWRITER DISCLOSURE
Despite criticisms leveled at Opinion 
07-446, by 2010, at least a dozen states 
had modified their procedural rules or 
ethics decisions to align with the ABA’s 
position.43 As commentators have noted, 
“The trend in the cases is in favor of 
allowing ghost written legal papers.”44 
Table 1 (at right) presents an overview 
of the four major types of current state 
rules (including both civil pleading/
signature rules and ethics committee 
opinions) governing disclosure of a 
ghostwriter’s identity. 
Table 1 includes the ABA’s pres-
ent position and that of D.C., but no 
category notation appears for the ten 
states that have no rule on any aspect of 
ghostwriting. The table shows 18 states 
 TABLE 1. FORMS OF STATE GHOSTWRITER IDENTITY DISCLOSURE RULES
State
Disclosure of ghost-
writer’s ID not required
Disclosure of  
ghostwriter’s ID 
required
Disclosure of  
ghostwriter’s ID required 
if assistance is “substan-
tial” or “extensive”
Disclosure of  
ghostwriting assistance 
required, but not  
ghostwriter’s ID
ABA X
AL X
AK X
AZ X
AR X
CA X
CO X
CT X
DE X
DC X
FL X X
GA no rule
HI no rule
ID no rule
IL X
IN no rule
IA X
KS X
KY X
LA no rule
ME X
MD X
MA X
MI X
MN no rule
MS X
MO X
MT X
NE X
NV X
NH X
NJ X
NY* X  (county) X  (state) X  (city bar)
NC X
ND X
OH no rule
OK no rule
OR X
PA X
RI X
SC
TN X
TX no rule
UT X
VT no rule
VA X
WA X
WV X X
WI                                                             X    
WY X
Total 19 9 7 8
Note: “No rule” means no state decision, court rule, or lawyer ethics opinion 
was found regarding disclosure of author of ghostwritten pleadings.
* This row, read from left to right, reflects the different positions of New 
York’s county, state, and city bar associations, respectively. 4
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(including D.C.) that explicitly permit 
nondisclosure of the ghostwriter’s iden-
tity. Nine states, however, require full 
disclosure. The states in between those 
extremes appear in the last two columns 
and are almost equally divided. Seven 
states require disclosure when the extent 
of the ghostwriting — or, for that matter, 
any form of limited-scope representa-
tion — is “substantial” or “extensive” 
(following the superseded 1978 ABA 
Informal Ethics Opinion 1414). Nine 
other states require the fact of assistance 
be disclosed but not the identity of the 
ghostwriter; such a disclosure might 
read, for example, “Prepared by a lawyer 
licensed in State X.”
The question of ghostwriter iden-
tity and other ethical issues relating 
to ghostwriting continue to be hotly 
debated in bench and bar meetings and 
in continuing legal and judicial educa-
tion programs. Lawyers in states that 
have a single rule on the subject are 
lucky to have some guidance. Those 
in the ten states with no 
state law or ethical guid-
ance whatsoever only have 
a multitude of anti-ghost-
writing federal opinions 
to go by. Lawyers in other 
jurisdictions, like New 
York and West Virginia, 
have multiple rules on 
the subject from different 
ethics bodies. So, confusion 
reigns from the lawyers’ 
perspective, which natu-
rally has a chilling effect 
on their willingness to 
ghostwrite. Many indi-
vidual judges, in addition 
to lacking guidance, have 
their own predilections 
about ghostwriting ethics. 
Some federal courts have 
raised state ethics rule 
violations over ghostwrit-
ing practices (or limited representation, 
generally), even when state law allows 
these practices.45 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RIGHT 
OF ACCESS TO COURTS
At present, federal and many state courts 
and ethics committees have diametri-
cally opposed views of the propriety of 
ghostwriting. Moreover, it is not unrea-
sonable to assume that between and 
within the federal and state judiciary 
there is also a divergence of opinion 
between judges who do not permit 
ghostwriting and judges who over-
look ghostwriting (or deny sanctions 
motions) because there is no author-
itative court decision on the matter, 
because those authorities that do exist 
are in conflict, or because no specific 
harm is shown. The authors of a recent 
book on the subject of ghostwriting in 
various professions and contexts accu-
rately note: “The weight of case law on 
this [anti-ghostwriting] side of the issue 
may be attributable to the strength of 
sentiment against pro se ghostwrit-
ing, for judges who accept the practice 
may have no reason to issue opinions in 
support.”46 This lack of uniformity of 
justice has implications not only for the 
right of access to courts, but the right 
to a fair process and equal justice after 
accessing the court. 
This disuniformity constitutes both 
a real barrier to justice and unequal 
justice. In fact, a strong argument can 
be made that these differences between 
the federal and state courts within a 
given state constitute a denial of equal 
protection. One can envision two pro 
se plaintiffs with a similar case, say, a 
personal injury matter. One files his 
complaint in federal court (invoking 
diversity jurisdiction because the defen-
dant is from out of state), and the other 
files in state court. The federal plaintiff 
would be prohibited from ghostwriting 
assistance, while the state court plain-
tiff would be able to benefit from it. 
19
70
19
71
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
91
19
94
19
96
19
97
19
98
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
25
20
15
10
5
0
 TABLE 2. FEDERAL AND STATE GHOSTWRITING CASES BY YEAR (N = 179)
Note: The percentages on this and all other tables have been rounded. Missing years are years in which no ghost-
writing opinions were published.
JUDICATURE                                          43
4
Which claimant would go further in 
the litigation and thereby secure access 
to justice? It goes without saying that 
the pro se plaintiff in state court would 
fare much better. Ghostwriting may 
not, of course, ensure victory, which is 
based on the facts and the law of the 
individual case, but it gives the pro se 
plaintiff a fighting chance at justice. 
The federal court plaintiff would proba-
bly not get past the dispositive motions 
stage without a ghostwriter’s assistance. 
He or she would therefore have a poten-
tial due process (which includes equal 
protection)47 claim against the federal 
court. Moreover, upon a possible appeal, 
the record in the federal plaintiff’s 
case would be far less complete than 
that in an appeal to the state appellate 
court. The state court appeal would be 
based on a fuller record, include more 
issues, and might be more detailed 
and comprehensible. The issues in the 
federal court appeal might not even be 
reached due to the ghostwriting prohi-
bition; thus, similarly-situated pro se 
plaintiffs’ cases would potentially have 
different results. 
ANALYSIS OF GHOSTWRITING 
OPINIONS 
There is no way of knowing the extent 
of undisclosed ghostwriting, but we do 
have 179 federal and state court reported 
and unreported opinions to date on 
the subject for analysis.48 In a previous 
study, I noted that no specific harm or 
prejudice from ghostwriting, other than 
a generalized allegation of undue advan-
tage, was found in the 96 cases studied 
there.49 The research reported here was 
conducted to further our understanding 
of ghostwriting, generally, and ghost-
writer identity-disclosure requirements, 
in particular. The disclosure require-
ments are unquestionably one of the 
most pressing issues surrounding this 
activity. This study examined the case 
law in order to answer the following 
questions: 
1. How frequently have courts 
addressed ghostwriting in 
published opinions? 
2. What courts have issued ghostwrit-
ing opinions? 
3. What are these courts’ views of 
ghostwriting?  
4. Who complains about 
ghostwriting? 
5. Who are the recipients of 
ghostwriting? 
6. Who are the ghostwriters? 
7. What is being ghostwritten? 
8. To what extent have courts entered 
sanctions against ghostwriters?
The frequency of ghostwriting opin-
ions has increased since the late 1990s, 
as has the frequency  of  pro se litiga-
tion. It is likely that the increase in 
pro se representation has contributed 
to the frequency of ghostwriting cases 
although the prevalence of ghostwriting 
itself can’t be measured accurately. 
COURTS ISSUING 
GHOSTWRITING OPINIONS
In Table 3, we see that it is the U.S. 
District Courts that have issued the 
overwhelming number of opinions on 
the subject (67 percent). Following 
the district courts are bankruptcy (12 
percent) and circuit courts of appeal (8 
percent). The fewest opinions have been 
issued by state supreme, appellate, and 
trial courts (collectively, 12 percent). 
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 TABLE 3. COURTS ISSUING GHOSTWRITING OPINIONS
U.S. Dist. Ct. Bankruptcy 
        Ct.
     U.S. Cir.  
     Ct. App.
  State Sup.
        Ct.   
 State App.    
       Ct.  
State Trial Ct.
(67%)
(12%)
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(3%)   (2%)
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 TABLE 4. COURTS’ VIEWS REGARDING GHOSTWRITING
Opposed No opinion Reservations 
about 
ghostwriting
Disclosed 
ghostwriting 
permitted
Required 
for initial 
pleadings
Ghostwriting 
held not 
misconduct
(53%)
(36%)
(8%)
(2%) (1%)   (1%)
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COURTS’ VIEWS REGARDING 
GHOSTWRITING
The largest number of court opinions 
evidence a judicial opposition to ghost-
writing (53 percent) as shown in Table 
4. A sizeable proportion (36 percent), 
however, discuss the subject because it is 
raised by one of the parties (or the court), 
but do not express an opinion on it. For 
example, the court may note that the 
complaint about a ghostwritten plead-
ing is not substantiated, and, even if it 
were, it is irrelevant to the case50 or “at 
best tangentially related to the substance 
of [the] litigation,”51 or the court may 
discuss ghostwriting in the context of a 
question about attorneys’ fees.52
 A smaller proportion of courts (8 
percent) indicate that they have reser-
vations about ghostwriting. The lowest 
proportion of cases (4 percent) reflect 
a judicial opinion that ghostwriting is 
permitted if disclosed, expressly permit 
ghostwriting for initial pleadings so 
long as it is disclosed, or have held 
that ghostwriting does not constitute 
misconduct.
SOURCE OF COMPLAINTS ABOUT 
GHOSTWRITING
Table 5 shows that courts (44 percent) 
and opposing counsel (30 percent) are 
the primary sources of complaints about 
ghostwriting. Pro se litigants some-
times expressly reveal ghostwriting 
in their own pleadings (11 percent). 
Less often the source of the ghostwrit-
ing complaint is an adverse party to 
an appeal (6 percent), a co-debtor in 
bankruptcy (3 percent), an attorney 
disciplinary commission (3 percent), 
insurance defense counsel (2 percent), 
or, on rare occasion, a pro se adversary 
of the pro se litigant receiving ghost-
writing assistance (one case).
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GHOSTWRITING RECIPIENTS
Table 6 shows that the bulk of bene-
ficiaries of ghostwriting are plaintiffs 
or petitioners (75 percent). Pro se liti-
gants are not, however, always plaintiffs 
or petitioners. Pro se defendants are in 
fact the second largest group of ghost-
writing recipients (19 percent). Less 
often, ghostwriting recipients are bank-
ruptcy corporate creditor (not pro se) or 
co-debtors (5 percent).
WHO ARE THE GHOSTWRITERS? 
Table 7 shows that licensed attorneys 
comprise the largest group (67 percent) 
of ghostwriters.53 Only 12 percent of 
the ghostwriters turn out to be unli-
censed (i.e., disbarred or out-of-state) or 
suspended attorneys. Occasionally, the 
court fails to identify the ghostwriter (5 
percent), or the ghostwriter is a nonlaw-
yer, a jailhouse lawyer, a paralegal, or 
even an “offshore company” providing 
ghostwriting services (collectively 11 
percent). There are some cases where the 
pro se litigant denies the ghostwriting 
accusation and insists the writings are his 
or her own (6 percent).
WHAT IS BEING GHOSTWRITTEN? 
Not unexpectedly, Table 8 shows that 
ghostwriting primarily takes the form 
of drafting, or responding to, disposi-
tive motions (30 percent) and drafting 
of complaints or amended complaints 
(27 percent). Ghostwriters also assist in 
drafting other pleadings (13 percent). 
Bankruptcy assistance, by way of 
preparation of schedules of assets and 
liabilities and assistance with adversary 
proceedings, is also a common form of 
ghostwriting (10 percent). Fewer exam-
ples of ghostwriting appear in cases 
involving appellate briefs (5 percent), 
habeas petitions (5 percent), and a variety 
of other litigation and discovery docu-
ments (collectively 5 percent). In some 
cases, the nature of the ghostwritten item 
is unspecified (4 percent), being generi-
cally referred to as legal papers.
IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS. 
Table 9 shows that a bare majority (54 
percent) of judges do not sanction the 
ghostwriter or the ghostwriting bene-
ficiary. A fair number (32 percent), 
however, do either sanction or threaten 
sanctions such as reprimands, reference 
to state ethical bodies, and fines against 
the ghostwriter. To a far lesser extent, 
courts sanction or threaten sanctions 
against the ghostwriting recipient (7 
percent). In the fewest number of cases, 
courts have treated the ghostwriting 
recipient’s pleading without the liberal-
ity to which pro se litigants are entitled 
(3 percent), or have refused to grant the 
ghostwriter’s motion to  appear pro hac 
vice (3 percent). In only one case did 
the court refused to consider or grant a 
motion (1 percent).
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Relevant to the ghostwriting contro-
versy are lawyers’ ethical obligations 
described in the MRPC Preamble: “A 
lawyer, as a member of the legal profes-
sion, is a representative of clients, an 
officer of the legal system and a public 
citizen having special responsibility for the 
quality of justice.”54 As a public citizen, 
a lawyer “should seek improvement of 
the law and access to the legal system, the 
administration of justice and the quality 
of service rendered by the legal profes-
sion.”55 “All lawyers should devote 
professional time and resources and use 
civic influence to ensure equal access to our 
system of justice for all those who because 
of economic or social barriers cannot afford 
or secure adequate legal counsel.”56 And 
lawyers also have an ethical duty to 
“provide legal services to those unable 
to pay.”57  These points all support the 
current ABA rule and justify ghost-
writing as a means of improving pro se 
litigants’ access to courts.
The conflicting federal and state 
positions, however, point to the need 
for clarification and uniformity regard-
ing ghostwriting and the disclosure of 
the ghostwriter’s identity. It is time 
for the federal and state judiciaries and 
the legal profession to adopt uniform 
rules governing ghostwriting. Uniform 
rules will help eliminate conflicting 
rules among federal courts, state ethics 
committees (or between the same state’s 
ethics committees), and individual 
judges, and such rules can enhance access 
to justice. One approach would be to 
request the Uniform Law Commission 
to develop a proposed uniform statute 
or rule on the subject. In order for that 
body to accept an issue for harmoni-
zation, “[t]he subject of the act must 
be such that uniformity of law among 
states will produce significant benefits 
to the public through improvements 
in the law,”58 which certainly applies in 
the ghostwriting context. Or, perhaps a 
joint state-federal task force composed 
of members of state and federal judi-
ciaries, such as representatives from the 
Conference of Chief Justices and the 
Judicial Conference of the U.S. Courts, 
as well as bar representatives could be 
empaneled to address the ghostwriting 
issue.
However a uniform rule is proposed, 
it should, in my view, contain the 
following elements: 
1.  The rule should recognize the pro 
se litigant’s general right of confi-
dentiality regarding the fact and 
identity of legal counsel, subject 
to disclosure for cause (e.g., filing 
a scurrilous pleading) or when 
an attorney personally appears to 
advocate on behalf of the client.
2.  The rule should establish a 
preponderance standard on any 
party complaining of a pro se 
litigant’s undue advantage from 
ghostwriting, requiring a show-
ing of specific harm from the 
practice. Such finding should be 
a condition for the entry of any 
order relating to the identity of 
the ghostwriter, the services he or 
she provides, termination of pref-
erences in treatment the pro se 
litigant would otherwise receive, 
or any other relevant issue.
3.  The rule should contain an 
explicit provision stating that 
a pro se litigant who receives 
limited legal (ghostwriting) assis-
tance is still entitled to be treated 
as a pro se litigant for all purposes 
not in the control of his attorney 
under a limited representation.59
 
The ghostwriting controversy must 
be resolved — and sooner rather than 
later. A discussion about uniformity is 
necessary to develop a consensus on the 
potential benefits and harms, if any, of 
the practice, to identify best practices 
for its management, and to provide clear 
guidance for lawyers willing to provide 
ghostwriting services.60 I agree with 
the admonition that, “[i]f legal ghost-
writing ceased to exist, indigent clients 
might find themselves completely with-
out legal assistance, which would surely 
have a negative impact on them and 
their families.”61 The time has come 
for federal courts and states to resolve 
the impasse, to harmonize conflicting 
ghostwriting rules, and to legitimize 
ghostwriting as a way to expand pro se 
litigants’ access to justice.
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